

Remarks

Applicants thank the Examiner for her careful consideration of this application and for the very helpful interview held on May 30, 2006. The contents of this interview are summarized below. Reconsideration of this application is now respectfully requested in view of the amendments above and the following remarks.

Summary of Interview of May 30, 2006: A personal interview regarding this application was held on May 30, 2006 at the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office ("PTO"). This interview was attended by Examiner Neveen Abel-Jalil, Primary Examiner Sam Rimell, and Applicants' undersigned representative. While no overall agreement regarding allowability of the application was reached, the topics of discussion and results, some of which include agreement on some of the issues, were as follows:

- Format for computer-readable medium claims (Claims 40 et al.): The Examiner and Primary Examiner discussed that current PTO policy is not to accept mere insertion of the word "tangible" to limit such claims to statutory subject matter. They suggested claiming a "computer-readable storage medium." Furthermore, they expressed a currently-held PTO view that the proper format should be something along the lines of, "A computer-readable storage medium containing software code that, when executed by a computer, causes the computer to . . ." Applicants' representative

disagreed, in principle, with the need for such changes but agreed that Applicants would make such changes, anyway, to expedite the examination process.

- Format of Claim 41: Applicants' representative explained that Claim 41 is in a form acceptable under the precedent of *Ex parte Porter*. The Examiner and Primary Examiner agreed to accept the format of this claim.
- Format of Claim 46: The Examiner and Primary Examiner discussed that it would be preferable to change the form of the verbs in this claim (e.g., "for traversing" to "to traverse"). Applicants' representative agreed to such changes.
- Format of Claims 3 et al.: The Examiner explained that she felt that these claims could be read in such a way that it would appear that the human-generated results would be the final results of the claimed method. However, it was suggested that, if these claims were amended to clarify that the human-oriented processes were merely intermediate steps of a primarily computer-oriented process, this may resolve the issue.
- Rejections Based on Legh-Smith et al.: Applicants' representative discussed how Legh-Smith et al. is directed to a meta-crawler, providing searches to multiple search engines, and is thus not a search engine. The Examiner and Primary Examiner discussed how the wording of the claims was sufficiently broad to include such a meta-crawler. It was discussed that the claims should be clarified to sufficiently distinguish that they are directed to a search engine, *per se*. In particular, it was

discussed that the claims should bring out that the search engine performs traversal of a network, filtering, and indexing.

Proceeding to the Office Action and the above amendments, Claims 1-58 remain pending in the application, with Claims 1, 46, and 54 being the independent claims. Claims 54-58 were previously withdrawn.

At page 2, the Office Action objects to Claims 40, 41, 46, and 48 based on various informalities. Applicants have amended Claims 40 and 46 to address these objections. On the other hand, Applicants respectfully traverse the objection to Claim 48 in that it has been purposely drafted so that the "interchangeable computer-readable storage medium" (as amended) may be the same as the previously-recited computer-readable storage medium or may be different. Applicants, therefore, respectfully request withdrawal of all of these objections.

At pages 3-5, the Office Action rejects Claims 3, 25, 40, 41, and 45-53 under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as being directed to non-statutory subject matter. These rejections are respectfully traversed for at least the following reasons.

Claims 3, 25, and 45 have been amended to clarify that the human-oriented filtering claimed is performed prior to indexing and is, therefore, only an intermediate process, in which a human interacts with the computer-based process. Claims 50 and 53 have not been amended to address these rejections; however, it is noted that the claims from which they depend either state or have been amended to state that the filters that Claims 50 and 53 modify are to be

implemented prior to the claimed indexer. Therefore, once again, any human interaction is merely an intermediate step of a (primarily) computer-based process.

The rejections of Claims 40, 41, and 46-53 were based on the recitation of a "tangible computer-readable medium." As discussed above, the relevant claims have been amended to recite a "computer-readable storage medium," thus limiting these claims to clearly tangible media.

At pages 5-6, the Office Action rejects Claims 1-53 under 35 U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph, as lacking sufficient written description. Based on the discussion at page 6, Applicants understand these rejections to relate to the rejections under 35 U.S.C. § 101, which have been addressed above. Therefore, it is respectfully submitted that these rejections, too, have been addressed. Should this not be the case, Applicants respectfully request a fuller discussion of the basis for these rejections.

At Pages 6-15, the Office Action rejects Claims 1-53 under 35 U.S.C. § 102(e) as being anticipated by Legh-Smith et al. (U.S. Patent No. 6,178,419). These rejections are respectfully traversed for at least the following reasons.

The invention as claimed in Claim 1 (as amended) is directed to: "A computer-implemented method of implementing a search engine to compile and access subject-specific information, associated with a particular subject, from a computer network, the method comprising the steps of:

traversing links between sites on the computer network, by said search engine;

filtering, by said search engine, contents of each site visited to determine relevancy of content to said particular subject; and presenting for indexing, at said search engine, information on each site deemed relevant to said particular subject by said filtering."

Consistent with the discussion at the above-mentioned interview, Applicants have amended Claim 1 to clarify that it is directed to a *search engine, not a meta-crawler*, as found in Legh-Smith et al. Some of the differences are as follows.

First, it is respectfully submitted that Legh-Smith et al. fails to teach or suggest "traversing links between sites on the computer network, by said search engine." The Office Action at Page 5 cites Legh-Smith et al. at col. 9, lines 23-67 and at col. 5, lines 31-44 as teaching this limitation. However, review of the former passage of Legh-Smith et al. reveals that this passage describes a process of building a query for a search engine, sending the query to the search engine, and saving the results. In other words, *there is no disclosure of traversing links between sites on a computer network in this passage*. The latter passage contains similar disclosure. Therefore, it is respectfully submitted that the system of Legh-Smith et al. merely sends queries to search engines; it does not traverse links of a network.

Next, it is also submitted that Legh-Smith et al. fails to teach or suggest "filtering, by said search engine, contents of each site visited to determine relevancy of content to said particular subject." The Office Action cites Legh-Smith et al. at col. 4, lines 47-67 and at col. 5, lines 1-27 as disclosing this limitation. A review of these passages reveals that they merely describe a

system and process for building and populating a database. Namely, searches are built and sent to search engines, and the results are stored. *Applicants are unable to locate any mention or description of any process that might be characterized as "filtering contents of each site visited to determine relevancy of content to said subject."* Furthermore, Legh-Smith et al. fails to describe or suggest such filtering being performed by a search engine, as claimed. Nor have Applicants been able to locate such filtering anywhere else in Legh-Smith et al.

Finally, it is respectfully submitted that Legh-Smith et al. fails to teach or suggest "presenting for indexing, at said search engine, information on each site deemed relevant to said particular subject by said filtering." The Office Action cites Legh-Smith et al. at col. 1, lines 23-35 as teaching this limitation. However, while this passage does mention that "[a] large Internet search engine may have a stored index of many millions of pages," Applicants have found no mention here (or anywhere else in Legh-Smith et al.) of "presenting for indexing" at a search engine "information on each site deemed relevant" to a particular subject "by said filtering," as claimed.

For at least these reasons, it is respectfully submitted that Claim 1 is allowable over the cited prior art. Because Claims 2-45 depend, directly or indirectly, from Claim 1, it is further submitted that they, too, are allowable over the cited prior art.

The invention as claimed in Claim 46 (as amended) is directed to: "A system to implement a search engine to compile and permit accessing of subject-specific information, associated with a particular subject, from a computer network, the system comprising:

a host computer to execute software stored upon a computer-readable storage medium to implement said search engine, the software comprising:

 a smart crawler of said search engine to traverse the computer network;
 a first filter of said search engine, to filter out sites, based on site contents, whose contents are irrelevant to said particular subject, and to permit only sites relevant to said particular subject to pass; and
 an indexer of said search engine to index the relevant sites; and
 memory, connected to the host computer, to store indexed subject-specific information generated by said indexer."

Similarly to Claim 1, Applicants have amended Claim 46 to clarify that it is directed to a *search engine, not a meta-crawler*, as found in Legh-Smith et al. Some of the differences are as follows.

First, Legh-Smith et al. fails to disclose "a smart crawler of said search engine," where "said search engine" is the search engine being implemented by the claimed system. The Office Action cites Legh-Smith et al. at col. 5, lines 36-44 and at col. 1, lines 23-35 as disclosing this limitation. However, Applicants note that these passages fail to teach the use of any "smart crawler." Applicants note, first, that the actual system of Legh-Smith et al. does not include *any* crawler(s); as noted above, it is a meta-crawler, and it merely builds and sends queries to search engines and collects the results. Second, Applicants note that the specific search engines discussed in Legh-Smith et al. all use conventional crawlers, which, as discussed at page 2, lines

9-17 of Applicants' specification, consider all information to be relevant. Applicants have defined the term, "smart crawler," at page 10 of their specification, as including "additional features that differentiate" it from other crawlers. Hence, these conventional crawlers, which are not part of the system of Legh-Smith et al., still fail to disclose a smart crawler, as claimed.

Next, Legh-Smith et al. fails to disclose "a first filter of said search engine, to filter out sites, based on site contents, whose contents are irrelevant to said particular subject, and to permit only sites relevant to said particular subject to pass." The Office Action cites Legh-Smith et al. at col. 5, lines 45-60 as disclosing such a filter. However, while this passage describes a form of filtering, it fails to describe the claimed filter, which is based on *relevance to the particular subject that is being targeted*. Second, the filtering in this passage is based on URLs rather than on sites' contents, as claimed.

For at least these reasons, it is respectfully submitted that Claim 46 is allowable over the cited prior art. Because Claims 47-53 depend, directly or indirectly, from Claim 46, it is further submitted that they, too, are allowable over the cited prior art, for at least the same reasons.

Applicant further points out a number of further differences between Legh-Smith et al. and various features of various claims:

- Claims 3, 25, 45, 50, and 53 include "approving" by a human editor. The cited passage of Legh-Smith et al. (col. 9, lines 1-16) merely discuss clicking on a URL in a result list. This does not show approval.
- Legh-Smith et al. fails to disclose (or even suggest) any kind of lexicon-based

filtering (see, e.g., Claims 4, 14, 47, and other related and/or similar claims). The cited passages of Legh-Smith et al. (in cols. 6-7) describe a way to build a directory by using a dictionary to look up a keyword and assign a number to the keyword based on the "sense" or meaning of the keyword in the concrete directory context. There is no lexicon-based filtering to determine relevance to a particular subject, as claimed.

- Legh-Smith et al. contains no disclosure or suggestion of dealing with component parts of a web page/document (see, e.g., Claims 5 et al.).

While Applicants do not necessarily concur with the Office Action's characterizations of the claims and/or the references with regard to other claimed features, Applicants choose not to discuss each such feature. Consequently, the lack of explicit discussion is not to be understood as indicating tacit agreement with such characterizations.


Conclusion

All of the stated grounds of rejection have been properly traversed, accommodated, or rendered moot. Applicants, therefore, respectfully request that the Examiner reconsider all presently outstanding objections and rejections and that they be withdrawn. Applicants believe that a full and complete reply has been made to the outstanding Office Action and, as such, the present application is in condition for allowance. If the Examiner believes, for any reason, that personal communication will expedite prosecution of this application, the Examiner is hereby invited to telephone the undersigned at the number provided.

Prompt and favorable consideration of this Amendment and Reply is respectfully requested.

Respectfully submitted,

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